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better or worse over time, or, if their neighboring

1. ABSTRACT

industrial plants are getting safer and cleaner.

The mapping of environmental data is rapidly
expanding as advocates and scholars offer various
platforms

to

environmental

display

and

information.

analyze
This

geographic

working

paper

describes an online web map that displays national
data from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI),
Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI)
ArcGIS Server platform, the Environmental Protection
Agency’s

(EPA)

Risk

Screening

Environmental

Indicators (RSEI), and methodologies from Kraft,
Stephan, and Abel (2011) to spatially display the
environmental performance of more than 17,000
manufacturing facilities.

2. INTRODUCTION
Twenty five years ago, Congress passed the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPRCA) that required thousands of industrial
facilities

to

reveal

what

toxic

chemicals

they

manufactured, used in their operations, and then
disposed into the environment. This 1986 legislation
came two years after the world’s worst industrial
accident in Bhopal, India. Hundreds of thousands of
nearby residents were exposed to the highly toxic
chemical methyl isocyanate when a Union Carbide
pesticide manufacturing plant experienced a massive

www.wwu.edu/huxley/spatial/maps/tri

leak.

The web map is supported by an online database

The poisonous plume killed over 3,000 people on

and provides its audience with the ability to visualize

the night of December 2, 1984 while harming a

facility performance over time, to individually search

100,000 more. Many estimates put the Bhopal

addresses, and display a toxic release inventory of a

disaster’s death toll over the following month at

spatial selection for different years. TRI facilities are

15,000 while it is widely described as affecting more

depicted as circles with colors that correlate to a

than 500,000 people. The disaster’s aftermath lingers

rating system that can be accessed through the map

decades later with hundreds of tons of hazardous

key. Smaller circles indicate fewer pounds released;

waste remaining at the site, high levels of pesticide

larger circles indicate more pounds released. Lighter

residues in neighborhood wells, and a variety of

circles represent polluters who are posing less risk to

chronic health problems linked to the plant’s toxic

their neighbors. Users are also able to access an

emissions (Crabb 2004; Sengupta 2008).

attribute table containing the facility name, parent
company, location, identification number, pounds of
toxics produced, and finally their RSEI relative risk
score.

People around the world were shocked by the
Bhopal disaster and alarmed that industrial facilities
could pose such risks to nearby communities and
their residents. Chemical industry advocates told the

The use of color and size contrasts presents the

U.S. Congress that the risk of a Bhopal disaster was

EPA data in a way that is more accessible to an

very low. Yet one year later at factory in the town of

audience that may not be familiar with TRI data.

Institute, West Virginia, a similar but smaller leak

Moreover, a time scale function allows viewers to

occurred.

perform a trend analysis between the years 1996 and
2007. The change of colors and sizes reflect
increases or decreases in performance so the viewer
will be able to see if a certain facility has been getting

In 1989, a report to EPA identified seventeen
Bhopal-level disasters over the previous 25 years with
releases in volume and toxicity equal to or exceeding
the 1984 disaster.

Between 1982 and 1989,

according to the report, 11,048 U.S. toxic chemical

Lesser, Abel & Stephan
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MAP 1. TRI FACILITIES IN 2007 NEAR INSTITUTE, WV.

accidents resulted in 11,341 injuries and 309 deaths

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(Shebecoff 1989).

(SARA) of 1984, with its new Title III, the Emergency
Planning

2.1.

RIGHT-TO-KNOW

West Virginia disasters, a push had begun for
right-to-know

Connecticut,
California

New York,

had

enacted

laws

Community Right

to

Know Act

(EPCRA), and the new Toxics Release Inventory

In the decade before the Bhopal and Institute
chemical

and

and

Michigan,

by
Maine,

information

1980,
and

disclosure

requirements on industry to give workers -- and
sometimes communities -- access to chemical
releases at local manufacturing facilities. Philadelphia
adopted one of the first right-to-know laws in 1981

(TRI) program. As one observer put it, “The Bhopal
train was leaving the station, and we got the kind of
legislation we could put on the train” (Kriz 1988,
3008). Unable to ignore the right-to-know momentum,
President Reagan signed SARA in 1986. The next
year, EPCRA authorized the EPA to begin requiring
companies to report the release and transfer of toxic
waste from a list of priority chemicals that posed risks
of acute human toxicity, chronic human toxicity, and

followed by several cities in California and Cincinnati

environmental toxicity “. . . at concentration levels that

in 1982. Seventeen states and sixteen municipalities

are reasonably likely to exist beyond facility site

had similar laws by 1984 and by mid-1985, twentyeight states had them (Hadden 1989; Kriz 1988). The

boundaries as a result of continuous, or frequently
recurring, releases” (EPCRA 1986).

push for the right-to-know about environmental

Over the years, the EPA has added new

pollution and other hazards was shaped as well by

chemicals to an original list of 300, bringing the total

broader

public

registry to more than 650 pollutants. The normative

expectations for business and governmental decision

argument for information disclosure policies like the

making (Eisner, Worsham, and Ringquist 2006;

TRI is rooted in ideas about the public’s right to

Hamilton 2005; Harris and Milkis 1996).

access certain information and the government’s

social

forces

changing

the

Within three months of the Bhopal disaster,
several

Congressional

bills

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

merged

into

the

responsibility to ensure the information is available so
that citizens can make sensible choices. In fact, the
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lack of sufficient information to foster competition or to

standards to control end-of-the-pipe pollution, and

allow consumers to

centralized federalism. Or, as one recent appraisal

represents
market

a

appropriate

choices

classic
failure.

Requirements
information

make

for
disclosure

also may be seen as

put
A third way of environmental governance
would become a critical response to
administrative rationalism and the concentration
of environmental policy power at the national
level or in subnational government agencies.

it,

the

environmental
were

widely

“heavily

initial

regulations
viewed

as

bureaucratic,

prescriptive, fragmented in

essential to justice in a

purpose, and adversarial in

democratic society which

nature” (Durant, Fiorino, and

requires that people be

O’Leary, 2004, 1). However,

aware of the potential harms to their personal

a decade of experience within this system and the

security, including their health and well-being (Stern

emergence of new issues led to growing pressures for

and Fineberg 1996).

change (Vig and Kraft 1984).

The public’s right-to-know in our representative

A

second

epoch

saw many developments

democracy can be traced to concepts in the nation’s

towards the emphasis of either economic or risk

founding ideals that average citizens are entitled to

analysis (NRC 1983; Russell & Gruber 1987; Smith

know what their elected leaders are doing on their

1984; Swartzman Liroff & Croke 1982). One of the

behalf. Later, and at the same time that the nation’s

notable institutional challenges faced by management

major environmental policies were being created,

at the EPA was its lack of an organic act and multiple

public expectations grew not only for a more open and

laws pulling the agency in many directions. Moreover,

accountable government (Gormley and Balla 2008;

vague and even conflicting legislative language

Williams and Matheny 1995), but also for any

resulted in multiple definitions of acceptable risks and

information that a particular organization or economic

different considerations of costs and benefits. These

sector might have a moral responsibility to share.

ambiguities spurred efforts in the executive branch to

Information disclosure, as a form of public policy, also

establish control over a seemingly irrational regulatory

can be understood to be what Schneider and Ingram

system.

(1997) called a capacity-building tool. By informing or
enlightening people, it acts as a partial step towards
empowering

people

to act

through democratic

processes.

In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive
Order 12291 that required the Cost-Benefit Analysis
(CBA) of all regulations expected to have an annual
economic impact of at least 10 million dollars, raise

TRI’s moment in the history of environmental

prices, or adversely affect competitiveness (Reagan

policy’s evolution came near the end of two decades

1981). Three years later, the EPA administrator

of institutional and political development. The first

declared that risk assessment and risk management

decade, or “epoch” of regulatory policy (Mazmanian

would become a primary decision making framework

and Kraft 1999) involved the establishment of

for the agency (EPA 1984). Both economic and risk

environmental policy as a national priority in the U.S.

assessment were attempts to bring a common

and a series of “command-and-control” regulations

denominator to decision making in a fragmented and

(Marcus 1980, Melnick 1983, Reagen 1987). Some of

adversarial environmental policy regime.

the main features included a focus on human health
and margin-of-safety analysis, technology forcing

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

However, below this current of technocratic and
rationalizing

policy
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democratic impulses were swirling. “Beginning in the

citizens in environmental decisions (Abel and Stephan

1980s,” according to Sirianni and Friedland (1995),

2000; Layzer 2002).

“more

participatory

alternatives

to

top-down

environmental regulation and the public lobby model
of formal citizen participation . . . started to emerge in
the United States” (5). The TRI’s arrival in 1987
helped amplify this democratic turn away from the
centralized and commanding or the technocratic and
rationalizing ways of the EPA. A third way of
environmental governance would become a critical
response to administrative rationalism and the
concentration of environmental policy power at the
national level or in subnational government agencies.
The resisting discourse echoed a communitarian tone
and emanated from the local level. “Communitarian
thought suggests ... a common public interest can be
discovered if an enlightened citizenry governs directly
in its own behalf” (Williams and Matheny 1995, 27).
Dissatisfaction with the centralization of power led to
the

emergence

of

hundreds

of

locally

led

environmental initiatives. Several researchers call this
approach

civic

environmentalism

(John

1994;

Knopman, Susman, & Landy 1999; Shutkin 2000;
Sirianni & Friedland 2001).
These

democratic

At the end of the Clinton presidency, the civic
environmental impulse briefly ascended to national
prominence when the EPA (2000) released a draft
public involvement policy aiming to enhance early and
meaningful public participation and techniques to
foster it in environmental decision making. Expanding
environmental decision making involvement even
received support at the beginning of the Bush
administration. New EPA administrator Christine Todd
Whitman (2001) proclaimed that the agency would “. .
. launch a new era of cooperation among all
stakeholders in environmental protection.” She would
also describe another policy priority: “We will use
strong science. Scientific analysis should drive
policy.” Thus, U.S. environmental policy in the 1990s
seemed to simultaneously emphasize more public
access in decision making and scientific analysis.
“But,” as Abel and Stephan (2008) asked, “do these
concurrent means—participation of citizens and use of
technical

expertise—amount

to

an

irreconcilable

tradeoff” (152)? Or, as Foreman (1998) put it,
“Perhaps the most interesting and important question

impulses

facing environmental scholars and policymakers as

strengthened across states and localities during the

we approach the new century is how, if at all, we

nineties—environmental policy’s third epoch. In this

might achieve a more satisfying and durable blend of

period,

the technical and democratic demands that weigh so

John

(1993)

environmental

asserted

that

policy

developments were progressing more in the states
and communities than at the national level. He noted
a doubling of state expenditures in natural resource
and environmental programs since 1986 and how
cases of innovation in pollution prevention, ecosystem
protection, and energy conservation emerged in the
states. This new environmental federalism also
stimulated the attention

of both scholars and

practitioners (Adler 1998; Anderson & Hill 1997;
NAPA 1995). In addition to the devolution of policymaking responsibility from the federal government to

heavily on environmental policy making” (59).
Numerous researchers (Cline & Lamb 2005;
Press 1994; White & Hall 2006) have applied a great
deal of attention to this very tension, or what some
called a “technical information quandary” (Pierce and
Lovrich

1986).

Likewise,

a

rationalizing

and

democratizing dissonance also echoed across the
field of geography during the 1990s as the technology
of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) accelerated
in use.

state and local jurisdictions, there also have been
expositions on attempts to increase the influence of

Lesser, Abel & Stephan
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Table 1. Terminology for the Democratization of Cartography
Cartography 2.0

Digital map design, collaboration, and access via the Web.

Citizen sensors

Spatial data collection enhanced by non-expert collaborators.

Mashup

Web-based mapping applications that mix data from two or more sources and
facilitates cartographic visualization and communication.

Metadata

Data about geographic data such as descriptions about what the data
represent, how the data was collected, who collected and distributed the data,
the data’s timestamp, and information to display the data in a coordinate system
and projection.

Neogeography

The growth of non-expert geography applications, techniques, and data made
available via the Web.

Open source

Software designed and developed to be freely distributed and customized by
new users.

Web 2.0

Web design that enhances online data exchange, collaboration, and more
equitable levels of access and participation.

In one summary (Jordan et al. 2011), the

2.2.

democratizing turn in geography involves an array of

DEMOCRATIC GIS

In the fall of 1993, a debate between human
geographers and geographic information scientists
became the focus of meetings held in Friday Harbor,
Washington. These meetings became widely known
as the beginning of the geography field’s discussion
over GIS and Society (Gatrell 1997; Nyerges,
McMaster & Couclelis 2011; Pickles 2006; Sheppard
et al. 1999). The beginning exchanges between
human geographers and their GIS counterparts
involved debates around the field’s future emphasis
between the technical or social. This debate, and the
one in environmental policy discussed above, could
be seen, as Schuurman (2000) observed, “. . . part of
a broader negotiation over the value and meaning of
science and technology and their relationship to the
culture in which they are embedded” (571).

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

shifts (See Table 1 above). Defined as Public
Participation

Geographic

Information

Systems

(PPGIS) by one (Sieber 2006), participatory GIS
(Elwood 2006) by another, and community-orientated
GIS (Harris & Weiner 1998) by a third perspective;
geographers faced a similar “democracy-technocracy
quandary” (Steel 2000) as their counterparts in
environmental science and policy. In particular,
cartographers faced a challenge of doing maps with
increasingly

sophisticated

GIS

tools

while

simultaneously increasing transparency for, and
participation by the public. On the one hand, tools like
Google Earth, Wikimapia, and OpenStreetMap can be
used by amateurs to produce and distribute maps that
address community concerns like environmental
injustice (Maantay 2002). On the other hand, “Much
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or

analysis by the Fitchburg city paper, the Sentinel &

documentation about the data. Metadata should

Enterprise. But in Maine, industry reported a 13

document the accuracy, authorship, and timestamp of

percent increase in pollution or 1.1 million pounds

the geospatial data” (Jordan et al. 2011, 158).

more than the year before (Miller 2012).

of

Web

2.0

is

without

formal

metadata,

For instance, Goodchild has described several

What often gets overlooked in the reporting of

errors in Google Earth (Goodchild 2007; Schuurman

national summary data is that states and even

2009). Rather than take sides, several researchers

facilities can vary widely in their changes from year to

instead advocate an amateur-expert alliance in efforts

year. In fact, the fundamental idea behind the TRI is

where GIS becomes a mediating tool for the multi-

that requiring facilities to submit annual reports of

disciplinary sharing of data, knowledge, and expertise

their toxic release into the environment will stimulate

(Jordan et al. 2011; Joyce 2009). We share this

efforts by companies to substantially reduce their

perspective and designed this web mapping tool in

pollution. A kind of “shock-or-shame” theory is

the spirit of blending rationalizing and democratizing

fundamental to this presumption where one of two

elements that represents a kind of “civic” cartography.

things may happen (Stephan 2002). On the one hand,

We also hope that our geospatial design will help

citizens or other political actors may act to pressure

address another challenge

the pollution output of industry when new information

programs:

the

dilemma

for toxic disclosure

of

fostering

industrial

environmental performance.

shocks them and reinforces concerns or fears about
the risk of exposure to pollutants. On the other hand,
companies

3. INDUSTRIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE AND

the

environmental

bad performer. However, the nature of the information
is critical.

United

State

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) each year
publishes a report of the latest data from the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI is EPA’s most wellknown information disclosure program. As the data
are made available, one sees a flurry of media reports
that disseminate to the wider public some basic
information about the nature of toxics releases. In one
of the earliest release dates for the TRI program, the
EPA published the 2010 national analysis on January
5, 2012. For the first time in history, the TRI recorded
a double digit increase in emissions, or 16 percent
more pollution than the previous year. This increase
occurred despite a drop in reporting facilities of two
percent. In Massachusetts, 441 TRI facilities reported
a drop of 1.12 million pounds since 2009 in an

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

their

attention they may receive due to being listed as a

In what has become a rite of spring for
journalism,

improve

performance because they worry about the negative

INFORMATION USE
environmental

may

If information is new and surprising, then citizens
or political actors may be motivated to participate in
environmental politics or policy. Once the information
loses its newness in these cases, theory suggests
that political actors would be less likely to be
influenced by the continued provision of information.
One might expect that a steady stream of information
would desensitize political actors, unless there were
dramatic changes in the data that suggested the need
for increased attention. In fact, the structure of TRI
data is essentially unchanged from the program’s
inception twenty-five years ago. As Kraft, Stephan,
and Abel (2011) concluded, “. . . it is clear that the
kind of information the TRI provides would be more
useful to facility managers, public officials, and
citizens if it could be presented in ways that better
clarify relative public health risks and are more easily

Working Paper 2012-01
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understood, particularly for nonprofessionals at the

fourth category of performance, brown facilities

community

became riskier and dirtier. Table 2 replicates the

level”

(186).

In

that

vein,

these

researchers suggested a framework for illuminating

environmental

performance

characterizations

for

the environmental performance of facilities over time.

industrial facilities from Abel, Stephan, and Kraft

Providing the data by facility in pounds of releases

(2007) for 1991-1995 using the latest version of RSEI

has become a less meaningful metric to most citizens.

(3.2.0) and adds data from 1996, 2000, and 2007.

Since its inception, the TRI’s skeptics have

Between 1991 and 1995, facilities decreasing

criticized its self-reported nature and many other

releases outnumbered those increasing pollution

problems with the information disclosed in the

levels by eight percent (54 to 46 percent respectively)

inventory. For instance, annual public releases until

while a nearly equal number of facilities decreased

2012 have lacked any risk characterizations that

risk as those that increased risk (Table 2 above).

would allow a comparison of various toxic releases or

These results suggest that the TRI program is

the relative hazard of different facilities. In fact, EPA

perhaps not as successful as many have assumed it

documentation on using the TRI begins by telling

to be. Green facilities outnumbered brown facilities by

potential users that the database’s chemicals can

only four percent. The remaining 20 percent of

vary widely in their toxic effects. One’s perception of

facilities fall into the interesting hybrid categories

and attention to high-volume releases may be

where release and risk performance move in opposite

misdirected when more toxic chemicals are being

directions. As described in earlier work (Kraft et al.

released at lower volumes (U.S. EPA 2002b). We

2011):

avoided this limitation by utilizing the EPA’s Risk
Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) software
program version 2.3.0 to characterize the relative risk
of TRI facilities by air emissions. Moreover, Abel,
Stephan and Kraft (2007), consider facility by facility
changes in risk over time as one dimension of

The “. . . achievements and benefits of the TRI
program are by no means uniform. They vary
considerably across industrial sectors, states,
communities, and individual facilities. . . The EPA and
independent analysts have focused on the aggregate
trends across all manufacturing industries, a practice
that tends to give a misleading picture of how facilities
are performing” (182).

environmental performance. The second dimension

For

captures the direction of a facility’s performance by its

performance

change in release volume.

substantial decreases in overall emissions can occur

Together, changes in risk and releases were used
to fashion a 2 x 2 matrix with directional increases and
decreases coinciding or diverging into four kinds of
industrial environmental performance in toxic pollution
trends. When both releases and risk levels decrease;
a facility becomes safer and cleaner and could be
classified with a greening performance. In a second
category of performance were blue facilities who
reduced risk but increased release volumes (i.e.,
safer but dirtier). Yellow facilities populated a third
category of performance by decreasing release levels
to get cleaner but increasing their relative risk. In the

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

instance,

the

yellow

characterization

category

of

demonstrates

our
how

at the same time that facilities are increasing risk. Any
new TRI presentation must help viewers take this
variation into account and our mapping tool provides
one kind of approach to display facility by facility
performance trajectories. Above, two tables display
the environmental performance of those facilities
reporting in 1996, 2000, and 2001. We also omitted
facilities in the bottom deciles of both risk and release
to concentrate on the more significant producers of
toxic pollution. From 1996 to 2000, the gaps among
different levels of aggregate facility performance
widened.
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Table 2. Industrial environmental performance for TRI facilities.
Adapted from Abel, Stephan, & Kraft (2007).
1991 - 1995

1996 - 2000

2001 - 2007

Lesser, Abel & Stephan
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The percentage of facilities in the five years

work of Scholz’s (1991) “enforcement” dilemma and

between 1996 and 2000 getting dirtier and riskier

Potoski and Prakash’s (2004) “regulation” dilemma.

(Brown TRIs) dropped by eight percent while greening

Governments have two basic choices (though one

facilities increased by four percent. Therefore, the gap

can think of these on a continuum as well): focus on

between facilities in the different release performance

compliance or encourage facilities to go beyond

categories increased to 16 percent; a fourfold

simple compliance.

increase from the first five years considered by Abel,
Stephan, and Kraft (2007).

In much the same way, facilities can either meet
the letter of the law or work to go beyond minimal

The most dramatic shift is discernible on releases

requirements. Simply put, without outside pressures

alone, or the column totals. The difference between

to change the payoff structure, the equilibrium

facilities reducing versus increasing releases in this

position leads to less preferred outcome. The first

second time period was 24 percent (Table 2 above).

number in each box represents the payoff for

Conversely, there was only an eight percent gap

government and the second number represents the

between facilities getting safer and those getting

payoff for the facility. The payoffs are consistent with

riskier. In the next seven years, the gaps changed far

standard restrictions placed upon prisoner’s dilemmas

less dramatically; 26 percent between

(Scholz 1991, 118).

release

reducers and increasers and 13 percent between risk
reducers and increasers. These results beg this
question: Why such a divergence between pollution
volume

performance

and

risk

reductions?

We

speculate that the greater progress in release
reductions are a function of what Fiorino (2004)
described as the “compliance imperative.” Since
facilities are required to report their releases and their
volumes

are

disseminated

annually

in

EPA

documents and websites, environmental managers

No matter which approach government chooses,
facilities are better off complying: b > f and d > h.
Likewise, regardless of facility behavior, government
is always better off commanding: c > a and g > e. To
break out, regulators need to offer facilities benefits
for superior environmental performance. One step is
the creation of a mapping tool that allows users to
view facility performance over time as we describe
below.

focus on improving the publicly disclosed information.

Annual reports on volume and national or even

The business adage, “You manage what you

state trends fall short. The performance dilemma

measure,” would apply. But more broadly, these

implies that government and facilities will stick with

results also are consistent with Kraft, Stephan, and

the status quo of command-and-control rather than

Abel’s (2011) “performance dilemma” described next.

pushing beyond compliance. Our belief is that our
mapping tool, which also includes risk performance,

3.1.

could serve to motivate the policy actors to reach for

ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE

performance synergy. Progress towards the greening

DILEMMAS
Table three below lays out a simple heuristic that
we use to better understand the dilemma that facilities

of industry is much more likely when the focus is on
the ceiling of performance rather than the floor.

and governments (federal or state) face in the area of

The performance dilemma serves as a valuable

industrial pollution management. The heuristic is

heuristic but oversimplifies what theory would predict

grounded in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport

about the influence of multiple factors (including

and Chammah 1965), filtered through the subsequent

information disclosure policies).
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Table 3. Environmental Performance Dilemmas.
Adapted from Kraft, Stephan, & Abel (2011).

Governments and facilities are enmeshed in a

volume performance. Why? We hypothesize that

network that includes legislatures, interest groups,

because the TRI has traditionally disclosed only

and citizens. The performance dilemma occurs within

volume information, facilities have acted accordingly.

the context of a series of principal-agent games (see

They reduce what’s reported or “manage what is

Scholz (1991) for his argument about “enforcement

measured.”

dilemmas”). In the real world facilities will appear in

geospatial tool that allows viewers to see not only the

any of the four boxes in the table. As Kraft, Abel, and

relative size of a facility’s pollution emissions, but also

Stephan (2011) observe in their book:

a color representation of their relative risk.

“In

cases

where

governments

focus

on

encouraging facilities, but facilities focus solely on

Therefore,

we

have

produced

a

4. DATA AND METHODS

compliance, the actions of governments can be seen

We developed a cartographic system that allows

as weakly cheering on facility behavior while facilities

viewers to quickly see clusters of facilities creating

themselves

legal

higher risk and volume where limited monitoring,

requirements. When both governments and facilities

inspection, and pollution prevention resources could

focus on minimal standards, performance itself does

be directed. We also joined the few studies (Abel

not exceed threshold expectations. Facilities that

2008, Abel and White 2011, Ash and Fetter 2004,

reach beyond compliance without governmental

Downey 2007, Sadd et al. 2011, Shapiro 2005;

encouragement may get a pat on the back, but no

Sicotte and Swanson 2007) that utilized a new

other credit is forthcoming. Finally, when both

exposure risk-characterization model developed by

governments and facilities focus on increasing

EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics

performance, the rules and regulations set only a

(OPPT). The Risk Screening Environmental Indicators

baseline to strongly surpass” (47).

(RSEI) tool contains records of multiple chemical

do

just

enough

to

meet

However, as Table 2 and 3 demonstrate, the
dilemma is not inevitably tragic. Many facilities get
safer and cleaner but risk performance lags behind

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

releases from TRI facilities. The model accounts for
local meteorology and simulates a facility’ toxic air
release dispersion and concentrations to produce a
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comparative risk characterization of different air

RSEI calculations for relative risk based on the

pollution sources (Schmidt 2003).

following formula were recreated for all facilities in the

RSEI uses reported toxic chemical release
volumes from each TRI facility as inputs into a steadystate Gaussian plume model. It then simulates

database. The decile for total pounds of toxics
released and the decile for total risk score were
calculated and inserted into new fields.

downwind air pollutant concentrations from a stack or

ESRI ArcSDE (10.0) server technology was

fugitive source as a function of facility-specific

installed on top of the PostgreSQL server to provide

parameters (stack height, exit gas velocity), local

an interface between the RSEI data and the ESRI

meteorology, and chemical-specific dispersion and

ArcGIS Server (10.0) mapping capabilities. ArcGIS

decay rates. These factors are then overlaid on

Server was used to create REST service endpoints

demographic data taken from the U.S. Census to

allowing web apps to access all of the RSEI data. A

produce

the

separate service was created for each year between

surrounding population. The final product of applying

1996 and 2007. The ArcGIS API for Javascript was

the RSEI model is an indicator value that represents a

used to create an interactive map using our REST

risk characterization where users can discern and

endpoints to access and display the RSEI data. The

compare the relative hazard being produced by

latitude and longitude included in the RSEI data was

different facilities.

used to place facilities on the map. The decile for total

a

surrogate

dose

estimate

for

A facility is classified as a TRI source if it
conducts manufacturing operations within Standard
Industrial Classification codes 20 through 39 (with a
broader set of categories applicable after 1998, such
as metal mining, coal mining, and electric utilities that
burn coal); has ten or more full-time employees; and
manufactures or processes more than 25,000 pounds
or otherwise uses more than 10,000 pounds of any

pounds released by a facility was used to drive the
size of the symbol using the equation X^1.8 * n/20+2,
where X is the pounds released decile and n is the
zoom level.

Symbol color was assigned using the

RSEI risk score decile.

Four colors were used to

represent the first eight deciles, with each color being
used for two consecutive deciles. The 9th and 10th
deciles were each assigned their own color.

listed chemical during the year. TRI facilities are

A cache was built for each layer year to reduce

required to report annually to the EPA their annual

server load and reduce the amount of time the client’s

toxic waste emissions into surface waters, air, land,

web browser needs to render the map.

and underground injection wells at their site or

eliminates the problem of trying to render over 17,000

transferred

wastewater

facilities when zoomed out at the full extent. Instead,

treatment plants. Moreover, TRI facilities must also

the cache is a series of pre-rendered tiled png

report if they treat, recycle, or burn toxic wastes for

images. To minimize the size of the cache, and to

energy. For 2000, the TRI was expanded to include

reduce the amount of time needed to generate the

new

(PBT)

cache, tiles were only built for areas that have

chemicals, with lower reporting thresholds. The full

facilities. We also incorporated a time slider in the

TRI list now includes over 650 chemicals.

map interface. Changing the year on the time slider

off-site

persistent

to

landfills and

bioaccumulative

toxic

To facilitate the use of TRI data in our geospatial
mapping tool, we transferred data from RSEI’s
Borland database format into our enterprise level

This

changes the cached layer displayed on the map, so
that only data from facilities in the year selected are
shown.

PostgreSQL database server (8.4). In PostgreSQL,

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

Working Paper 2012-01

11

Coming Clean and Green

Huxley Spatial Institute

A search function was added that queries the rest

performance while others have no perceptible change

service for all years of data. The search returns a list

in risk or volume. Those facilities also remain a more

of facilities where the query matched all or part of the

concentrated risk cluster near East St. Louis, an area

facility name, parent company name, federal agency

that has raised environmental injustice concerns

name, facility id, or any part of the facility address.

before.

Clicking on one of the facilities returned by the search
result zooms the map to that facility. Clicking on a
facility on the map returns attribute information about
that facility, including the facilities name, parent
company, address, total pounds released, risk score,
and the direction of that facilities performance over
time.

people was 98% African-American with 41% of
households below the poverty level and 18.2%
unemployment. In 2008, Abel’s study of the St. Louis
riskscape found that: “one-fifth of the region’s air
pollution exposure risk . . . was concentrated among
only six facilities on the southwest border of East St.
Louis” (232). He also observed that the dominant

5. Demonstration
In

According to the 2010 census, this city of 27,006

the

following

pages,

statistical methods found in two decades of scholarly
we

provide

two

publications on environmental justice relied on the

screenshots from our web map to demonstrate the

statistics of averages that were blind to these extreme

utility of a longitudinal performance view. Each page

concentrations of risk and social vulnerability.

displays TRI locations along with representations of
each facility’s pollution volume (circle size) and risk
(color). Following Abel (2007), we also focus on the
metropolitan St. Louis region. St. Louis has been a
major industrial hub for more than a century because
of its mid-continental location and Mississippi river
ports. In the first landscape image below, a 1996

Also, the cartography that accompanied some of
the most cited environmental justice studies depicted
industrial pollution risks with a uniform point or symbol
on a map (Bowen et al. 1995; Pulido 2000; Downey
2003; Maantay 2002; Mennis 2002; Pastor et al.
2004; and Campbell and Peck 2010).

screenshot captured more than 100 TRI facilities. In

Our web application’s cartography avoids this

the 2007 display, less than 90 TRI facilities appear.

limitation with symbols that change color and size. In

This longitudinal comparison demonstrates several

the two maps on the previous page, a viewer could

features of our performance mapping approach.

discern

For instance, an attentive viewer could discern
how the south central part of the city loses several
medium sized volume and risk producers while in the
north – south corridor east of the Mississippi, several
large volume and risky facilities remain. In the
southwest part of the map, several small risk and

that

while

deindustrializing

the

between

St.

Louis

1996

and

MSA
2007,

was
a

significant cluster of facilities with higher volumes and
more risk remained near East St. Louis. An interested
viewer could then zoom in to one or two concentrated
risk clusters and focus their attention on a much
smaller portion of the riskscape.

volume producers disappear from an industrial cluster
but several big producers remain. Moreover, viewers
would also benefit from quickly seeing what facilities
display little to no change over a decade. For
instance, several facilities in the southeast part of the
map

appear

to

improve

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

their

environmental
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that are steadily improving their environmental
performance” (194).

6. CONCLUSION
Since the migration of the Toxics Release

Leading and lagging facility performance is

Inventory (TRI) from paper reports and compact disks

quickly discernible with the use of our web map’s time

in 1987 to the internet, numerous mapping tools have

slider.

been developed. The TRI Performance Explorer web-

We also, as Kraft et al. (2011) cautioned,

map joins this crowded field with several important

recognize the potential pitfalls of easier and wider

advantages. Our tool blends the democratizing

access to complicated risk and industrial output

access

the

measures in a web map. “The downside of easily

rationalizing features of a symbology informed by

accessible environmental information, according to

peer-reviewed scholarship, expert cartography, and

Kraft et al. (2011), is that riskscape geographies may

extensive metadata.

“. . . be incorrect or subject to misinterpretation,

of

the

internet

while

maintaining

In their assessment of the TRI, Kraft et al. (2011)

leading to unfounded public fears and inappropriate

next

actions” (187). One standard concern is that any map

generation of environmental information disclosure.

projection or facility characterization is a very limited

“The [EPA] could make it easy for users to find

view of reality and poses significant problems for

pertinent information. . . via an interactive map of

decision making. We would argue that the pros and

facility locations, releases, and risks” (188) and our

cons of incomplete information are a bit more

described

effort

here

several

offers

prescriptions

one

for

prototype.

the

They

also

complex.

recommended that TRI data should be presented in a

On the one hand, it’s true that information used to

way that facilitates the analysis of performance over

mislead, manipulate, or obscure true conditions on

time. The symbols in our current web map for a TRI

the ground can lead to faulty reasoning and therefore

facility change in color and size to depict increases or

bad decision making. On the other hand, incomplete

decreases of environmental performance. This design

information based on good intentions and in properly

allows a user to ascertain whether the facilities they

managed contexts has the ability to motivate better

are viewing are getting safer and cleaner, or riskier

information, which in turn can mean good information

and dirtier with the addition of a time-slider. Individual

that leads to, or adds transparency to solid reasoning,

facilities are also easily comparable in the viewing

good decision making, and a strong alignment

area. Moreover, users can select individual facilities

between values and behavior.

and obtain more information on the specific amount of
pollution volume and risk quantification derived with
the RSEI program.

Certainly policy actors want good information and
while there are other actors, with the best intentions in
mind, who would argue against faulty information

This design, we believe, offers a more practical

being used to drive policy action; incomplete or “bad”

resolution of facility-level variations and supports

information is better than no information. Many level

another important policy prescription from Kraft et al.

just such a critique at the TRI and its self-reported

(2011).

nature that is used for estimating the surrogate

“The appropriate strategy at both the federal level
is to target those facilities and firms that need greater
incentives or technical assistance to reduce releases
and risks while simultaneously encouraging,
recognizing, and rewarding those facilities and firms

inhalation doses driving RSEI’s risk characterization.

Lesser, Abel & Stephan

Our argument instead is that contested information,
properly mediated, opens a window for deliberative
processes that will lead to increasing the quality of
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information and fostering collective rationality. In fact,
this is why we have advanced our effort as a kind of
”civic cartography.”
Does our mapping tool rest on assumptions that
some may understand as faulty? Certainly. Does it
draw the journalist’s, analyst’s, or activist’s attention
to the “wrong” conclusions? Quite possibly. But at its
heart, we have created the mapping tool not as a be
all, end all; but as a tool that may foster a broader
conversation and motivate a rethinking of some basic
premises we find to be faulty, e.g., how focusing on
releases only and ignoring

risk can be very

misleading.
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